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Abstract
Models of electoral competition in which candidates can change position at no cost
predict the convergence of platforms in a two-candidate election. Such convergence
is at odds with empirical observation. In this paper, I undertake a study of candidate
positioning in the United States Senate and determine the extent to which electoral costs
associated with changing position explain the ideological positions taken by Senators.
Using over 50 years of roll call voting data, I use a simulated method of moments
approach to estimate a dynamic model of candidate positioning for U.S. Senators. The
findings support a model in which Senators face convex costs to changing position,
with the best fitting model being one with linear costs of adjustment. The model thus
predicts severe punishments for “flip-flopping” Senators (those who make large changes
in position). As a result of the significant costs associated with adjusting position, the
empirical validity of the Median Voter Theorem (which depends upon candidates being
able to change position at no cost) is called into question.
1 Introduction
Models of electoral competition often follow Downs (1957) and allow candidates to freely
adjust their positions in the issue space to capture the majority of voters. The result, in a
two-candidate election with a single dimensional policy space and single peaked preferences,
is both candidates adopting the position of the median voter. Such convergence is rarely
observed and is potentially at odds with the party polarization cited by the media and
academics (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal (1991)). A possible source of the non-convergence
of positions is candidate reputation (see, for example, Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985),
Enelow and Munger (1993), and Kartik and McAfee (2007)). That is, candidates may find
it costly to change positions in the issue space because it affects the voters perceptions of
the candidates credibility or character. Indeed, recent presidential hopefuls John Kerry and
Mitt Romney can attest to the electoral costs of changing positions to attract voters.
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The following study analyzes the nature of the electoral costs Senators face when ad-
justing their ideological position. Using over 50 years of roll call voting scores from the
United States Senate, I estimate the structural parameters of a dynamic model of candi-
date positioning. Using a simulated method of moments (SMM) methodology, I am able to
identify the nature of ideological adjustment costs in the U.S. Senate.
Understanding the electoral cost associated with a candidates change in position is
important for a number of reasons. First, by finding large costs to adjusting position,
one calls into question the empirical validity of the median voter model and the policy
predictions based upon it. Second, knowing the nature of these costs is important for
understanding the role of candidate credibility and reputation in electoral outcomes. For
example, if the costs Senators face are non-convex in nature, we would expect to see “flip-
flopping” Senators. That is, Senators who hold a position for long periods of time and
make relatively large changes in position when they do change. On the other hand, if the
costs Senators face are convex in nature, we would expect to see “wishy-washy” Senators.
These Senators would change position more often, but with only small moves. Knowing the
nature of the costs to changing position is important for predicting electoral equilibria and
will shed light on which theoretical models of electoral competition are most appealing on
empirical grounds.
The results suggest economically and statistically significant costs of changing position.
Further, models that best fit the data are those in which the costs to changing position are
convex, with the best fitting model being the linear adjustment costs model. That is, the
data show Senators who are not “flip-floppers”, but change positions slowly. The standard
Downsian model, and the median voter models of political equilibrium are found to be
inconsistent with the data on the ideological positioning of U.S. Senators. The theoretical
models found to be most consistent with the data are those where the costs to adjusting
one’s position are linear in nature.
1.1 Previous Literature and Motivation
Models predicting non-convergence of policy platforms in two candidate elections with a
single policy dimension come in several flavors. Alesina (1988) presents a model where
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politicians care about policy in addition to the rents from office and cannot commit to
policy platforms. This creates a principal agent problem between the representatives and
the voters. While the candidate would like to promise the median voter’s preferred position
to win the election, such a promise may not be credible and there for candidate platforms
will not converge. A second type of model whose equilibrium may have non-convergence
relies upon uncertainty by the voters about the policy to be implemented when the candidate
takes office. The policy in office may differ from the announced policy because of preferences
by the politician (as in Alesina (1988)), because of future events or because the candidate
is unsure about his own preferred position. Enelow and Munger (1993), Bernhardt and
Ingberman (1985), Ingberman (1989), and Banks (1990) all describe models of this type and
derive the equilibrium conditions of electoral competition. Models of Kartik and McAfee
(2007), Callander (2008), and Callander and Wilkie (2007) adopt a combination of the
previous two types. Some candidates are policy motivated and others are purely office
motivated. However, voters are uncertain about the type of the candidates. Candidates
may also have some attribute such as “character” that is valuable to the voters, beyond
the policy choice of the candidates. The uncertainty about type of the candidates causes
announced positions to become signals of a politicians type, leading to non-convergence of
platforms.
Each of these models of non-convergence imply something about the adjustment costs
faced by candidates. For example, Enelow and Munger (1993) derive the expected utility
of the voters for electing a particular candidate and show the expected utility decreasing
in the size of the change in the candidates’ policy platforms. Bernhardt and Ingberman
(1985) and Ingberman (1989) find similar results. The models of Banks (1990), Callander
(2008), and Callander and Wilkie (2007), and Kartik and McAfee (2007) do not include
past position as a state variable, but are only focused on positioning in a one-shot election
where candidates may face a personal cost to misrepresenting their position. However, in a
dynamic framework, signaling of one’s motivation is done both through one’s current choice
of position, and through the dynamics of one’s position. Whether the costs to adjusting
position in dynamic versions of these models are convex, as in Enelow and Munger (1993),
or non-convex (as might result from separating equilibria in a signaling game), depends
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upon the form of the personal costs to candidates for misrepresenting their position.
Empirical models of candidate positioning related to the analysis in the following sec-
tions include the work of Glazer and Robbins (1993), Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder and
Charles Stewart (2001), Levitt (1996), Bronars and John R. Lott (1997), Poole (2003), and
Poole and Rosenthal (1997). Glazer and Robbins (1993) find the ideological preferences of
voters have a substantial effect on the ideological positions of their Representatives. Us-
ing the Conservative Coalition interest group’s scores to identify the ideological position
of Congressman, they find the voters exert much control over the position of their Con-
gressman and deviations from the voters position are small, even for senior congressman.
Ansolabehere et al. (2001) use the National Political Awareness test to identify the positions
of both incumbents and challengers in over 100 years of House elections. They find much
of a candidates ideology is explained by his party, and in contrast to Glazer and Robbins
(1993), find little of a candidates ideological position is determined by local conditions.
Levitt (1996) finds Senators place the most weight on their own ideological preferences,
with the remainder of their ideological stance being approximately equally determined by
the preferences of their constituents and their party. Bronars and John R. Lott (1997) find
one’s roll call vote choices are not affected by PAC contributions, but that PAC contribu-
tions are determined by one’s ideological position. Poole (2003) finds little variation in a
Congressman’s position over his career when using his Nominate scores to define ideological
positions. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find the vast majority of the variation in roll call
voting records can be accounted for by a single dimension, the liberal-conservative spec-
trum. For example, how one votes on school-vouchers correlates very highly with how one
voters on tax reform and how one votes on welfare programs. Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
have found this single dimension is able to explain the majority of roll call voting patterns,
especially after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In fact, they find over 90%
of roll call vote choice can now be explained by the single dimension, liberal-conservative
spectrum. The empirical results and the theoretical models described above motivate my
use of such a single dimension in the empirical analysis done here.
None of the empirical work cited presents a dynamic model of candidate positioning.
The construction of a quantitative, dynamic model of candidate positioning is one of the
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major contributions of this work. However, the model and estimation used here owes much
to work in dynamic industrial organization, such as by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) study the nature of costs to manufacturing plants when
adjusting their stock of physical capital. The analysis here draws heavily on their methods
and characterization of adjustment costs. One can see a similarity between a plant’s choice
of physical capital for next period based on current and expected productivity shocks and
a candidates choice of position, which is based on the current and expected positions of the
voters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data used
and Section 3 discusses the reduced for evidence for a model in which Senators face costs
to changing position. Section 4 outlines the model of candidate positioning in a dynamic
environment. Section 5 presents the econometric methodology and discusses identification.
Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
Estimation of the model of candidate positioning requires data on the ideological posi-
tions of Senators and their constituents, observations of Senator retirement decisions, and
data on election outcomes. The data on Senate retirements and election outcomes is straight
forward to collect. These data come from Stewart and Woon (2006), the ICPSR, and the
Federal Election Commission and I omit and detailed discussion of these data sources. The
data on ideology requires a more thorough description.
Data on the ideological position of Senators and voters come from the Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) interest group ratings of roll call votes. Each year, the ADA
select a subset (20 votes) of the year’s roll call votes and rate each Congressman on a scale
of 0 to 100, where 0 means the Congressman voted against the ADA’s position on every
roll call vote and 100 means the Congressman voted for the ADA’s position on every roll
call vote. A score of 0 indicates the the Congressman is very conservative and a score of
100 indicates the Congressman is very liberal, as defined by the ADA. The sample period
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is 1947-1999. 1
Adjustments are made to these scores to allow them to be comparable across time and
chambers. These adjustments are described in Groseclose and Steven D. Levitt (1999).
Such adjustments to the raw ADA scores are necessary because the issues voted on vary
over time and across chambers and so the raw scores are not directly comparable. The
adjustments are used to allow the ADA scores to shift and stretch across time and chambers.
Thus converting raw scores to adjusted scores is similar to converting temperature from
Fahrenheit to Celsius. The adjusted scores are not bounded between 0 and 100. Table 1
presents some summary statistics for the adjusted and nominal ADA scores, separating out
the scores for each major party.
Table 1: ADA Scores
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Adjusted ADA Score 37.774 29.826
Democrats, Adjusted ADA Score 54.849 25.223
Republicans, Adjusted ADA Score 16.872 20.190
Nominal ADA Score 46.018 31.888
Democrats, Nominal ADA Score 64.655 26.596
Republican, Nominal ADA Score 23.206 21.172
There are several advantages to ADA scores over other measures of ideology, such as
the Nominate scores of Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. First, ADA scores have a
clear definition (i.e. position on the liberal-conservative spectrum, as defined by the ADA).
Second, due to the work of Groseclose and Steven D. Levitt (1999), they are comparable
over time and across chambers 2. Third, they are reported at a higher frequency. 3
The ideological position of each state’s voters is proxied for by the mean of the ADA
scores of the state’s House delegation. This follows the work of Levitt (1996), who uses the
same proxy for the preferences of each state’s voters. Figure 1 suggests the mean score from
the House delegation is a reasonable proxy for the preferences of the voters given the close
alignment between the positions of Senators and the voter proxy. 4
1Data from 1947-1959 is constructed by Tim Groseclose based on the ADA’s methodology and list of key
votes for 1947-1959. The ADA did not publish scores for this time period. Also, scores were not calculated
for 1962 and 1964.
2D-Nominate scores are comparable over time, but not across chambers. They are also constructed in
such a way as to constrain the ideological position of a Congressman to change in a linear fashion.
3ADA scores are reported annually, whereas Nominate scores are reported only for each Congress.
4I plan to also try the median stance of the House delegation and possibly other aggregates as the proxy
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Figure 1: Correlation of Senator and Voter Ideology
Because the ADA scores are based on such a small number of votes, there may be much
year to year variation due to the votes the ADA considers each year. To mitigate this noise,
I define a period as a term in the Senate and average the scores across the period. I do
not calculate scores for Senators who did not receive a score in 2 or more years of the 6
year term, ensuring the ideological position of each Senator is based on at least 80 votes.
This leaves me with 809 Senator-term observations over the sample period of 1947-1999.
Included in this sample are 357 different Senators. Of these 124 serve only one term, 95
serve two terms, 71 serve three terms, 45 serve 4 terms, and 22 serve five or more terms
during the sample period. From the sample, I am able to observe 470 potential changes in
position.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean years observe Senator 10.466
Mean size of change 0.286
Mean of abs value of change 6.630
Serial Correlation of changes -0.113
Serial Correlation of Abs Value of Changes 0.260
Correlation of changes in Voter and Senator 0.060
Correlation of voter and Senator ideology 0.544
Fraction of Jumps (≥ 20 point change) 0.019
Summary statistics for the ADA data are presented in Table 2. A histogram of the
for voter preferences.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Changes in Position by Senators
distribution of ideological changes are presented in Figure 2. Figure 2 presents the absolute
value of changes (|P−P−1|) and shows a distribution with a mass toward zero. Since upward
and downward movements (i.e. becoming more liberal or conservative) are assumed to have
identical costs, this figure is important for thinking about whether those costs are convex or
non-convex. Convex costs would suggest most movements would be small and there would
be a positive correlation between the movements. Indeed, the mass towards zero supports
this. Over 11% of the changes are less than one point on the ADA scale and over 20%
are less than 2 points on the scale. Non-convex costs would suggest a long right tail (i.e.
many Senators making big jumps), which is not evident from Figure 2. Of all changes in
position, the moves larger than 20 points on the ADA scale account for about 6.7% of the
total change in position. These “jumps” constitute 1.9% of the observations.
If costs were zero, then one would expect a high correlation between changes in voter
ideology and changes in Senator ideology and also a high correlation between the observed
ideology of Senators and voters. The correlation of changes in Table 2 is low, at 0.06 and
the correlation of observed ideologies is 0.544. A model with zero costs of adjusting position
would result in both of these correlations being 1.00.
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3 Reduced Form Evidence
The distance between the position of the Senators and the voters as measured by the ADA
scores certainly has an effect on electoral outcomes. The unconditional correlation between
a Senators’ share of the two-party vote and his distance from the voters is -0.25 and is
plotted in Figure 3. This relationship is strong and negative, as one might expect.
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Figure 3: Correlation of Ideological Distance and Vote Share
Changing position also negatively effects ones electoral prospects. The unconditional
correlation between the candidates share of the two party vote and the absolute value of
his change in position is -0.08 (Figure 4). While not as strong as the relationship between
distance and vote share, changes in position suggest a worse electoral outcome.
One might worry the unconditional correlation between vote share and the size of a
candidates change in position is biased downward because those who change in position
are likely to be those whose ideological position is far from the voters’ preferred point. To
correct for this, I regress the candidates share of the two party vote on ideological distance,
changes in ideology, and changes in state economic conditions, candidate seniority, and
national and state trends in party popularity. Tufte (1975) and Erikson (1990) find support
for the role of economic conditions in the outcomes of Congressional elections and prompt
me to control for changes in state income. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) find controlling for
national sways in opinion are important, therefore I include fixed effects for the interaction
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Figure 4: Correlation of Ideological Change and Vote Share
of the candidate’s party and the year of the election. I also include fixed effects for party-
state interactions, as a Democrat who is elected in a Republican state may face stronger
opposition in elections than a Republican, even if the measured ideology is the same.
Table 3: Effects of Changes in Ideology on Incumbent Vote Share
Dependent Variable: Candidate’s Share of Two Party Vote
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ideological Distance -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Abs(Change in Ideology) -0.172 -0.374 -0.118 -0.266
(0.128) (0.406) (0.145) (0.438)
Square of Change in Ideology -0.007 0.011 -0.005 0.008
(0.006) (0.020) (0.008) (0.024)
Seniority 1.149 1.164 1.132 -0.958 -0.965 -0.967
(0.709) (0.714) (0.708) (0.797) (0.799) (0.799)
% Change in State Income 11.898 11.795 11.89 2.568 2.542 2.646
(8.624) (8.641) (8.649) (8.723) (8.714) (8.762)
Year*Party Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Party Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs 325 325 325 325 325 325
R2 0.972 0.971 0.972 0.986 0.986 0.986
Table 3 reports the results of these regressions. Ideological distance is defined as the
square of the distance between the voters and the Senator, (θ − P )2. Changes in ideology
are measured in two ways. First, by the absolute value of the change, |Pi − Pi,−1|. Second,
by the square of the change in position, (Pi − Pi,−1)
2. The coefficients on distance from
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the voters and changes in positions have the expected (negative) sign in all specifications.
Changes in state income are positively related to a candidates electoral prospects, which is
anticipated, as all candidates included in the regressions are incumbents. In fact, they are
all incumbents with at least two terms of tenure, which is needed to calculate changes in
position. The effect of seniority is not consistent across models, but after the ”sophomore
surge”, the literature finds small returns to being an incumbent.
While the change in ideology isn’t statistically significant, I find changes in position
negatively affect ones vote share in any model. A 10 point change in ideology results in a
decrease of between 1.1 and 3.7 percent of the vote share, which is non-trivial. In fact, in
model (1), a change in position of 6.63 ADA points (the average size of a change in position)
is equivalent to a candidate being 9 ADA points further away from the voters. A difference
of 9 points is more than the average distance between the positions of John McCain and
Strom Thurmond.
There is a potential for a downward bias on the coefficients on ideological distance and
changes in position. This bias comes from two sources. First, if running in an election is
costly, those who run are likely to be those who anticipate winning. This means, those who
are closer in position to the voters and who do not have to make large changes will run for
office, while those who are far from the voters and would have to make large changes do not
run. Second, even among those who run, those who change position are going to be those
who are more likely to lose the election. That is, the decision to change position is in part
determined by the likelihood of winning, which not only affects the decision of running, but
is related to vote share if one does run. In order to account for these possible sources of
bias, I estimate Heckman selection models where I instrument for the decision to run with
the candidates seniority and models in which I instrument for changes in position with the
change in position of the voters. Both models give larger point estimates of the coefficients
on changes in position, but the standard errors are very large.
Another way to control for selection and the endogeneity of changes in position is to
estimate a model of candidate positioning in a more direct fashion. This has the further
advantage of controlling for the position of challengers. By not controlling for the position
of challengers, I am biasing the estimates of the effects of changing position. For example,
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imagine a case where the challenger takes a position very near the median voter and has a
record that is close to the median as well. In such a case, the incumbent will likely have
to move close to the median also, but he will face a low probability of winning since the
challenger is also close to the median voter. So a large change comes with a low probability
of victory, biasing up the estimates of the electoral costs to changing position. In the next
section, I discuss the theoretical model of candidate positioning when changing position is
costly.
4 A Dynamic Model of Candidate Positioning
4.1 Model of Voters
Let a voter’s preferred position and identity be θ. Candidates and voters have common
knowledge of θ, a point in a one dimensional policy space. Call this space “ideology”.
Voters are myopic, voting for the candidate in the current election who maximizes their
expected utility, a function of the policy the candidate puts into place one in office. Further,
assume the demographics of the district change over time. That is, the distribution of θ
will evolve. Thus medianθt may not equal medianθt+1. Note, while the distribution of θ
changes, this does not mean each of the voters’ preferred points change only that there are
changes in the composition of individuals that make up the Senators’ constituencies.
Assume the voter’s utility is quadratic so the expected utility of θ voting for candidate
i is:
Eu(i, θ) = E(−(P
′
i − θ)
2)− C(Pi, Pi,−1) + ξi (4.1)
Where ξi is a random component to the voters’ utility, which is distributed i.i.d. and is
unobserved by the candidates at the time of their platform choices. This can represent some
surge of popularity during the election that is orthogonal to the popularity of the platform
and is often called “valence” in the political science literature.
The function C(Pi, Pi,−1) is the “cost of adjustment”. In a sense it is a punishment
by the voters for a candidates change in position. One may parameterize this function in
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several ways, according the story of electoral competition on thinks correct. I discuss the
specification of this function shortly.
The state variables for the voters’ problem are the voters’ preferred points, θ, the current
positions of the candidates, Pi, the past positions of the candidates, Pi,−1, and the transitory
shock to the candidates’ electoral chances, ξi.
4.2 Candidates
The model period unfolds in the following order. First, the incumbent chooses his policies
and platform in office, Pi. Together, the incumbents record from previous periods, Pi,−1 and
the current policy choice influences the voters’ expectations about the incumbents position,
E(P
′
i ), and the cost of adjustment associated with the position, C(Pi, Pi,−1). After E(P
′
i )
and C(Pi, Pi,−1) are determined, the challenger selects his current platform given his record
and the position of the incumbent. Last the election is held and the winner realized.
Politicians care only about the rents from office and not their policy positions per se.
Therefore, they chose a position to maximize the utility of the median voter and thereby
maximize the probability of getting elected.
Given the assumption of ξi ∼ i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value and additive separability, we
can write the politicians expected probability of victory as:
Pr(i wins|Pi, Pi,−1, Pi,−1, Pj,−1,medθ) =
exp(Eui(Pi, Pi,−1,medθ)
∑2
i=1 exp(Eui(Pi, Pi,−1,medθ))
(4.2)
Therefore, candidate i chooses the Pi to maximize:
Wi(Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ) = R+βPr(Pi, Pj , Pi,−1, Pj,−1,medθ)Emedθ,P ′j
Wi(Pi, P
′
j , Pj ,medθ
′)
(4.3)
Candidates choose a position to maximize the probability of getting elected. This is
highest if they get as close to possible (again, bearing in mind the costs of adjustment) to the
median voter in each period. Without a stochastic term in the instantaneous utility function
of the voter, this is 0/1, with the winner completely determined by the past positions of
13
the candidates.
4.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is found when: 1) Voters chose the candidates who maximizes utility, given
the relevant states variables, including current positions of candidates 2) Incumbents choose
positions to maximize utility, given the preferences of voters and the positions of challengers.
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4.4 Ideological Costs of Adjustment
4.4.1 Zero Costs of Adjustment
If changing position has no effect on a candidate’s electoral prospects, then we are in the
stylized Downsian world. In this case, C(P,P−1) = 0 and candidates will always align
themselves with the current position of the median voter, regardless of their past position.
4.4.2 Convex Costs of Adjustment
Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985), Ingberman (1989), and Enelow and Munger (1993)
derive equilibria of electoral competition when voters are uncertain about the policies of
candidates. The voters may be unsure the candidate will deliver on their campaign promises
for a number of reasons. Writing the expected utility of voting for candidate i:
Eu(i, θ) = E(−(P
′
i − θ)
2) + ξi (4.4)
One can pass through the expectations operator, perform some algebraic manipulation
and find:
Eu(i, θ) = −(E(P
′
i )− θ)
2)− σ2Pi + ξi (4.5)
Here, costs to changing position are represented by uncertainty by the voters about the
5Voters expectations about future positions of candidates do not have to be consistent with the choices
made by candidates in the model, as I am not enforcing rational expectations on the part of the voters. This
is consistent with the assumption of voters who are not aware of the game the candidates are playing.
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future positions of candidates. Given risk averse voters, as uncertainty about the future
policies of the candidates increases, expected utility decreases. As shown by Enelow and
Munger (1993), voters may use the past record of candidates to update their expectations
about the candidate. In Enelow and Munger (1993), a change in position by the the politi-
cian increases the uncertainty of the voters and does so in a quadratic manner. Uncertainly
increases at a rate proportional to the squared difference between the politicians past and
current positions. This result is captured in the following specification of adjustment costs:
σ2P = C(P,P−1) =
γ
2
(P − P−1)
2 (4.6)
Facing the convex adjustment costs of Equation 4.7, Senators will not be very respon-
sive to changes in the preferences of their constituents. While candidates will want to align
themselves with the voters, the costs of changing position increase quickly as one makes
larger moves. Such costs force Senators to change position only in small increments. Sen-
ators will be “wishy-washy”, making slight moves in any direction as the voters’ preferred
points in the ideological space change, but rarely making large jumps in their ideological
position.
In addition, I also estimate a model where the costs of adjustment are linear. Such costs
are consistent with the models of Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) and Ingberman (1989),
who allow the uncertainty of voters to be any function that is increasing the size of the
deviations of candidates from their past record. These costs take the following form:
σ2P = C(P,P−1) = κ(|P − P−1|) (4.7)
4.4.3 Non-convex Costs of Adjustment
Still other models of candidate positioning assume the costs of adjusting one’s position
is the signaling of one’s character. That is, voters derive utility from both the ideological
stance of the politician and from the “character” of the politician. Kartik and McAfee (2007)
and Callander and Wilkie (2007) models with just such a mechanism. In a dynamic version
of these models, there may be a non-linear relationship between the size of one’s change in
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position and the penalty on pays for the change. If one either has character or does not (as
in Kartik and McAfee (2007)), holding one’s ground signals good character, any change in
position signals one has no character. In a separating equilibrium, no character types will
reveal themselves by changing position. Since character is valuable, these candidates will
face a lower probability of election than candidates who have the same platform, but have
character. This is modeled by a non-convex cost of adjustment where there is a fixed cost
to adjusting position. The adjustment cost function is thus:
CNC(P,P−1) = 0 (4.8)
Where CNC is the cost function when one does not change position (P = P−1). And:
CC(P,P−1) = −F (4.9)
Where CC is the cost function when one changes position and F is the fixed cost to
changing position. Call the associated probabilities of re-election PrNC(Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ)
and PrC(Pi, Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ), respectively. On can thus write the dynamic program-
ming problem of the Senator as:
W (Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ) = max[W
NC(Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ),W
C(Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ)]
(4.10)
Where
WNC(Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ) = R+βPr
NC(Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ)Emedθ,P ′
j
W (Pi, P
′
j , Pj ,medθ
′)
(4.11)
and
WC(θ, P−1, ξ) = R+ βPr
C(Pi, Pi,−1, Pj , Pj,−1,medθ)Emedθ,P ′j
W (Pi, P
′
j , Pj ,medθ
′) (4.12)
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Candidates facing fixed costs to changing position will changes positions only when they
are further away from the voters than a certain threshold, as determined by F . Senators
facing fixed costs to adjustment often hold positions for a long period of time, but make
larger changes than those in the convex models when they do change.
5 Structural Estimation
5.1 Empirical Model
One must make assumptions about the expectations of voters. I assume voters have the
following expectations. First, E(P
′
i ) = λPi + (1 − λ)Emedθ
′
. 6 Voters take into account
the evolution of the distribution of preferences when forming expectations over next periods
policy choice. As in Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985), Ingberman (1989), and Enelow and
Munger (1993), one might assume the function C(·, ·) is increasing in the distance between
a candidates current policy choice and his record. That is, voters perceive candidates who
have larger changes in position as having more uncertainty in their policy choices next term.
Candidates whose current platforms are consistent with their records create less uncertainty
in the minds of voters. Or one might follow the stories of Kartik and McAfee (2007) and
Callander and Wilkie (2007) where politicians have character. Such a model leads to costs
of adjustment that are independent of the size of one’s change in position.
In order to estimate the dynamic model described above, one needs data on the past
records of both candidates, the current positions taken by both candidates, and the preferred
position of the median voter. While I use ADA scores to proxy for the current and past
positions of those who have served in the Senate, I don’t observe the past positions of first
term Senators and I observe neither the past nor the current position taken by those who
have never served in the Senate.
Because of this limitation, I am going to make the following assumptions about the past
6The policy put in place next period may differ from voter’s expectations because of the realization of
θ
′
. In addition, voters have uncertainty because they do not know the game the politicians are playing.
Voters are not assumed to have rational expectations. This is consistent with the work of Bernhardt and
Ingberman (1985), Ingberman (1989), and Enelow and Munger (1993). I follow their arguments against
requiring rational expectations on the part of voters. The general argument is that RE places to much
discipline on the behavior of voters whose contribution to the election outcome is so small. Retrospective
voting strategies are supported by Fiorina (1981) and even by Downs (1957).
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positions of challengers and about the uncertainty voters have about the future positions of
these challengers. The model of challengers is rather reduced form, but consistent with both
an incumbency advantage (as in Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985)) and with the model of
candidate positioning described above.
I assume a challenger’s current position, PC , and the costs associated with this position,
CC , are drawn from a stationary bivariate normal distribution with mean µ and covariance
ΣC . These assumptions imply the expected utility of electing a challenger is:
Eu(C, θ) = −(E(P
′
C)− θ)
2 − CC + ξC (5.1)
Where the function E(P
′
C) is a function of the current position of the challenger, PC ,
which is modeled as a random draw. The lack of data on the past positions of those who
have not served in the Senate necessitated the modeling of PC as a random process. In
addition, because I do not want to assume challengers and incumbents face the same costs
to changing position, the costs of adjustment, CC , associated with the challenger and his
position is also a random draw. That is to say, I model the challengers’ best response
function as a random process. I could have made an assumption about the challengers’ cost
of adjustment function and only have had to draw the past position of the challenger, but
one is not able to identify both the parameters of this cost function for the challengers and
the distribution of their past positions. Therefore I model the best response function (a
current position and adjustment cost) of the challengers by a stochastic process. Allowing
for a correlation between ones current position and the uncertainty of future positions is
natural as one might expect there to be more uncertainty if a candidate adopts a more
centrist position because he may be playing to the voters (see Enelow and Hinich (1981),
Kartik and McAfee (2007))
This all implies the probability the incumbent wins can be written as:
Pr(i wins|PI , PI,−1, PC , σ
2
C ,medθ) =
exp(EuI(PI , PI,−1,medθ)
exp(EuI(PI , PI,−1,medθ)) + exp(EuC(PC , σ2C ,medθ))
(5.2)
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The assumptions on the utility and expectations of voters, on the stochastic valence of
candidates, on the motivation of candidates, and the exogenous process describing chal-
lengers put structure on the model. The parameters of this structure is estimated using
data on the positions taken by Senators on the liberal-conservative spectrum defined by
the ADA. The candidates’ rate of time preference β is set to an annual rate of 0.96. The
expected value of a candidate’s policy next period is determined by expectations about he
evolution of the median voter and the parameter λ. This parameter is pinned down by the
equilibrium condition requiring voters to have expectations about the future policy that
are correct on average. The following parameters need to be estimated: µ, ΣC , and the
parameters describing the costs of adjustment function C(Pi, Pi,−1). I assume the mean of
the distribution of challenger ideology is the same as the mean from the distribution of the
median voters’ preferred points. For the following analysis, I also assume the covariance
between the ideology of challengers and the adjustment costs of challengers is zero. These
assumptions leave me four parameters to estimate for each model : the mean costs of ad-
justment associated with challengers, C¯C , the standard deviation of challenger positions,
σPC , the standard deviation of challenger adjustment costs, σCC , and γ, κ, or F , if the
model if the convex adjustment cost model or the non-convex adjustment cost model.
Additionally, one needs to know the median preferred point of the voters. This is proxied
for by the mean ADA score of House members from the state. It’s evolution is assumed
to follow a stationary AR(1) process, the parameters of which is estimated outside of the
structural model (since it is exogenous to the choice of position by Senators).
5.2 Estimation Procedure
The parameters underlying the model of candidate positioning, Θ = (µ,ΣC , γ, κ, F ),
are estimated using a simulated method of moments (SMM) procedure as described in
McFadden (1989). The use of SMM over alternative methods of estimation such as max-
imum likelihood, was done for several reasons. First, SMM is transparent. The moments
I choose to match are well measured, clearly defined, and easily interpreted. Second, ML
is more computationally burdensome to estimate since one must calculate the conditional
probabilities of changes in position at all the grid points in the state space.
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The procedure has the following algorithm. For a given vector of parameters, Θ, the
dynamic programming problem (DPP) of the Senator is solved for. The solution to the DPP
is a set of policy functions determining the Senator’s optimal choice of ideological position
given his past position, the past position of the challenger, the adjustment cost associated
with the challenger’s position, and the current position of the voters and the electoral shock
ξ. These policy functions are used to simulate a panel of Senators and voters. A set of
moments is calculated from the simulated panel. Call the vector of simulated moments
Ψs(Θ).
The estimate Θˆ is the vector of parameters that minimizes the weighted distance between
Ψs(Θ) and the vector of moments from the data, Ψd. Formally, Θˆ solves:
£(Θ) = minΘ[Ψ
d −Ψs(Θ)]′W [Ψd −Ψs(Θ)] (5.3)
Where W is the optimal weighting matrix, calculated as the inverse of the variance
covariance matrix of the data moments, as described in Smith (1993). This weighting matrix
is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the moments, calculated by bootstrapping
the data. Using the SMM procedure with the optimal weighting matrix ensures consistent
and efficient estimates of Θ.
In the minimization routine, the vector Θ is updated using a simulated annealing algo-
rithm (Goffe and Rogers (1994)). Such an algorithm is very effective at finding the global
minimum in cases where the objective function is non-linear in its parameters, as in this
case.
5.3 Estimating the Preferences of Voters and Non-electoral Exit Proba-
bilities
In addition to the parameter vector Θ, the decisions of the Senators depend upon re-
tirement probabilities and the expectations of the future positions of voters.
Retirement probabilities are assumed to be constant. On average, just under 10% of
Senators retire each term. The probability of retirement, δ, is found to be 0.097. 7
7This is the simplest case. In general, the retirement probability may depend upon age and the distance
between the Senator’s position and the position of the voters. The distance between voters and Senators may
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Understanding the persistence and variability in the preferences of the voters is an
important component to the solution of the Senators’ dynamic programming problem. The
bliss point of the decisive voter is unaffected by the positions of the Senators and is assumed
to follow and AR(1) process:
medθi,t = (1− ρ)µi + ρmedθi,t−1 + ǫi,t (5.4)
It is assumed ǫ ∼ N(0, σǫ). The preferences of the decisive voter are proxied for by
the mean score of House Representatives from the Senator’s state as done in Levitt (1996).
The AR(1) process is estimated using a least squares approach where the mean of the
auto-regressive process is allowed to vary across states. Both ρ and σǫ are restricted to be
constant across states and are found to be 0.44 and 11.50, respectively. The AR(1) process is
then approximated by a first-order Markov process following the method of Tauchen (1986)
to determine the transitions of the voters in the discretized state space of the computational
model.
5.4 Moments and Identification
To estimate Θ, I choose to match the following moments: the fraction of jumps 8, the
serial correlation of changes in position, the re-election rate of incumbents, the correlation
between re-election rates and the distance between a senator and voter’s position, the
correlation between the ideology of Senators and voters, the correlation between the ideology
of Senators and voters for first term Senators, and the standard deviation of positions for
first term Senators. While each of moment is affects by every parameter to some extent, I
discuss next which moments contribute most to the identification of each parameter.
The fraction of jumps and the serial correlation in changes of position are most infor-
mative about the size and nature of the costs of adjustment. In the quadratic adjustment
costs model, a larger value of γ implies fewer jumps. The fixed-cost model has more jumps
s than the quadratic model, and the number of jumps increases as F decreases (for certain
affect the retirement probabilities because elections are costly and therefore one’s decision run may depend
upon their chances of winning. The chance of winning depends upon, among other things, the ideological
distance between the voters and the Senator.
8A jump is defined to be a change in a Senator’s position of at least 20 points on the ADA scale.
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Table 4: Moments Used For Estimation
Moment
Fraction of Jumps (≥ 20 point change) 0.019
Serial Corr of Changes -0.113
Incumbent Re-election Rate 0.832
Correlation(win,distance) -0.111
Correlation of voter and Senator ideology 0.544
Correlation of voter and 1st term Senator ideology 0.500
Freshman Re-election Rate 0.807
ranges of F ).
The serial correlation is also informative about the nature of the costs of adjustment.
With quadratic costs of adjustment, one will find a relatively high degree of serial correlation.
This is because Senators will not make large changes in position all at once because the
costs to changing position are increasing with the size of the change. With linear costs of
adjustment, the marginal cost of a change in position does not depend upon the size of
the change, so the changes will be larger and the serial correlation lower. When costs are
independent of the size of one change, as in the fixed cost case, the serial correlation will
be lowest. Under fixed costs of adjustment, candidates will only change position when they
are beyond a certain threshold from the voters. When Senators facing fixed costs change
position, they will move very close to the voters at one time, resulting in a serial correlation
that will be lower than in the two models of convex adjustment costs.
Re-election rates are determined by a number of the parameters, but they help to pin
down the distribution of standard deviation of challenger uncertainty, σ¯C . Higher levels of
challenger uncertainty lead to a larger incumbency advantage and thus higher incumbency
re-election rates.
The correlation of Senator and voter ideology is significantly affected the size of the
costs of adjustment and the the standard deviation in the level of challenger uncertainty,
σσC . To separate the standard deviation in the uncertainty associated with challengers from
the size of the costs of adjustment for incumbents, I include as a moment the correlation of
Senator and voter ideology for first term Senators only.
Finally, the standard deviation of challenger positions, σPC is identified by matching
re-election rate of freshman Senators. This rate is is determined by the positions these
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Senators campaigned on and the electoral cost to changing this position.
6 Results of Structural Estimation
The structural model is estimated estimated using ADA data from 1947-1999. Table 5
presents the results of estimation, reporting the parameters of the cost function, the values
of the moments and the minimum statistic. All models are estimated fixing λ at 0.5 and
the covariance of challenger position and challenger adjustment costs at 0. In addition to
the baseline cases of zero, quadratic, linear, and fixed costs to adjustment, I also estimate
a combination model. This model combines the quadratic costs of adjustment with fixed
costs to adjustment. Such a model allows for both the role of uncertainty (as in Enelow
and Munger (1993)) and character (as in Kartik and McAfee (2007)).
Using the minimum statistic as the criteria, the model with linear adjustment costs
does the best at capturing the relevant moments. It is able to come very close to all four
moments, and, in particular, does a much better job than the fixed cost model on matching
the small number of large moves found in the data. The model with no costs of adjustment
is clearly rejected by the data, with Senators being much too responsive to changes in voter
ideology.
Table 5: Results of Structural Estimation
Model No Cost Linear Quadratic Fixed Cost Fixed and Quad Data
Parameters
γ 0.000 0.000 2.040 0.000 0.983 -
- - (1.700) - (0.119) -
k 0.000 12.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
- (0.045) - - - -
F 0.000 0.000 0.000 360.453 73.896 -
- - (97.392) (34.716) -
Moments
Frac Jumps 0.173 0.015 0.000 0.048 0.003 0.019
Serial Correlation 0.340 0.217 0.333 0.054 0.237 -0.113
Re-elect Rate 0.832 0.836 0.830 0.820 0.846 0.832
Corr Ideo 1.000 0.560 0.551 0.366 0.548 0.544
Corr Win/Dist - -0.033 -0.015 -0.006 -0.024 -0.111
Corr Ideo, Freshman 1.000 0.497 0.413 0.358 0.451 0.500
Re-elect Rate, Freshman 0.806 0.832 0.826 0.817 0.841 0.807
£(Θ) 1054.983 22.232 58.238 78.292 33.593 -
As in the reduced for estimation, one finds large effects of changing position in the
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structural models. Any model with a some costs of adjustment does much better at matching
the relevant moments than does the model with no costs of adjustment. In the linear cost of
adjustment model, a change of 6.63 ADA points (an average size change) lessens a candidates
chances of victory by the same probability as being about 9 points further away from the
voter along the ideological spectrum. This is very close to the quantitative significance
found in the reduced form models.
Of the models with positive costs to adjustment, the worst fitting model is the model
which posits fixed costs to adjusting position. In this model, any change in position, re-
gardless of the size, established uncertainty in the minds of the voters and negatively affects
a candidates electoral prospects. Such a model results in a serial correlation of changes
that is closest to that found in the data, although no model can replicate the negative
serial correlation found in the data without being much farther away from the other mo-
ments. Because of the large cost for any size change in position (any change incurs a cost
equivalent to being about 18 points further way from the voters- more than the average
distance between Senators Joseph Lieberman and Ted Kennedy), the correlation between
the ideologies of Senators and voters is much lower than in the data.
Still, any model with a positive cost to adjusting one’s position fits the data much
better than the zero cost model. Senators move towards the voters, but, because of costs
of adjustment, do not align themselves perfectly with the voters. Models where costs to
changing position increase with the size of the change are the most consistent with the data.
7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to provide an understanding of the nature of “flip-
flopping” among United States Senators. Using a large panel on the ideological positions of
Senators and various empirical approaches, I have been able to come to several important
conclusions regarding the costs Senators face when changing position.
First, I was able to document electoral costs to changing position. These costs are
economically significant, with changes in position being penalized as much as differences
between the ideology of the voters and Senator. Furthermore, I was able to clearly show
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that models which include adjustment costs fit the data much better than the Downsian
zero cost model. A model with a linear cost to adjusting position was found to fit the data
best. That is, Senators face costs to deviating from their past records directly proportional
to the size of their change in position.
Overall, the results provide more evidence against the stylized version of Downs’ model
and the validity of the median voter theorem as a description of a representative democracy.
Flip flopping is indeed punished; Senators find moving towards the preferences of voters is
best done in small moves. While multiple models of electoral competition are likely to
be consistent with such a cost function, it is nonetheless important to understand such
costs and their implications for electoral equilibrium such as non-convergence of candidate
platforms.
Costs of adjusting position imply that the Median Voter Theorem (where the winning
policy is that of the median voter) does not hold. Both my finding of costs of adjusting
ones position and the empirical observation of the divergence of ideology between voters and
Senators attest to the empirical failure of the median voter model. Understanding which
model of adjustment costs fits the data best, will help in the development of a more realistic
model of political competition.
A drawback of the model of electoral competition presented is that it does not fully
specify the dynamic models that result in the costs to adjusting position. Specifying such
a model is left a worthwhile goal. To my knowledge, no one has written down a model
where changes in ideological position are costly as the polls and the voters have rational
expectations. Many have proposed models where such costs are incorporated in a reduced
form way (see, for example Banks (1990)), but there is not a model addressing “flip-flopping”
per se.
Confirming this model on other interest group ratings, such as those of the American
Conservative Union, would help to ensure the results. Additionally, combinations of the
models, such as a model with both a fixed and quadratic cost to adjusting may fit the data
better. These will be addressed in future research.
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